

HOW TO INTERCEPT ENCRYPTED MESSAGES ON ANDROID



ABOUT ME

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MY (MOSTLY FAILED) GOAL

- Find remote vulnerabilities in Android messaging clients
 - Facebook Messenger
 - Whatsapp
 - WeChat
 - Signal
 - Telegram

WHY E2E ENCRYPTED MESSAGING?

- Some messengers do not encrypt, or encrypt from device to server and then server to device
 - Server can sanitize messages
 - Exploiting a remote server blind is *hard*
- End-to-end encrypted messages cannot be altered by server
 - Must be processed on device

PROBLEM

- How to alter messages inside the encryption wrapper?
 - Bugs that occur pre-encryption are rare
 - Ideally want to alter a message and have decryption and signature verification succeed

POSSIBLE STRATEGIES

- Implement the protocol
- Find existing tools
- Stubbing

IMPLEMENT THE PROTOCOL?

- Most messengers publish their encryption protocols
 - Since we know our own key, we should be able to replicate it
- But, but ...
 - Documents are long and possibly inaccurate
 - A lot of work and very error prone

USE EXISTING TOOLS

- There's a lot of authorized and unauthorized apps that bring mobile messengers to the desktop
- Looked at many of them, and they often use different protocols (external APIs)
- E2E encryption often not implemented

STUBBING

Basic idea:

- Find where message is encrypted
- Insert code after the message has been serialized, but before it has been signed or encrypted
- Code sends message to remote server, where it can be changed
- Altered message gets sent to test device

FINDING THE ENCRYPTION POINT

- Start by decompiling the application APK using apktool
- Get smali files out
- Typically obfuscated
- Android applications contain a lot of unused and rarely used code

```
.method public constructor
<init>(LX/8A2;LX/0G1;LX/0G1;LX/89x;LX/1q1;LX/1Xs;LX/0wj;LX/0G1;LX/1pr;LX/0wQ;LX/0oS;LX/0dK;LX/0wO;LX/0G1;LX/1q5;LX/0wm;)V
    .locals 10
    invoke-direct {p0}, Ljava/lang/Object; -> <init>()V
    iput-object v9, p0, LX/89y; -> c:LX/8A2;
    iput-object v7, p0, LX/89y; -> d:LX/0G1;
    iput-object v6, p0, LX/89y; -> e:LX/0G1;
    iput-object v5, p0, LX/89y; -> f:LX/89x;
    iput-object v4, p0, LX/89y; -> g:LX/1q1;
    iput-object p4, p0, LX/89y; -> h:LX/1Xs;
    iput-object v1, p0, LX/89y; -> i:LX/0wj;
    iput-object v0, p0, LX/89y; -> j:LX/0G1;
```

STRATEGIES

- Look for known libraries
 - libsignal
 - Java crypto
- Focus on natives
- Log entries

KNOWN LIBRARIES

- Most E2E encrypted messengers include `libsignal`
 - Unfortunately, full feature set is not used
 - Putting in a stub where `libsignal` encrypts messages (based on Signal source) did not work on most messengers

JAVA CRYPTO LIBS

Cheap trick:

- Make a build of Android that has a stub in `javax.crypto.Mac`
- Make the stub send the digest only when it can access a file in the sandbox of the app you're testing
- Will get a lot of stuff that isn't messages, plus sometimes messages
- Works on about half of messengers

JAVA CRYPTO LIBS

- Also possible to put log entry that outputs Java stack in Java crypto libs
- Can help you find where the app is encrypting the message
- Relies on the app actually using Java crypto
- Apps often implement their own encryption (wrap a native library), but usually use Java for signing
- Once output stacks in `System.arraycopy` when I was desperate
- Can also search smali, but no guarantee stuff gets called

NATIVES (JNI)

- Java Native Interface calls cannot be obfuscated (easily)
- Calls with 'encrypt' in the name are good candidates for stub locations
 - Messaging encryption is usually native
 - Be careful to separate file encryption from network encryption
- Made a script that outputs log entries for every native call

JNI QUESTION

In a Java application, can native code be run without a JNI call?

No.

- JNI can start threads, etc, but native code **always** starts with a JNI call in an Android Java application

LOG ENTRIES

- Some apps have a lot of helpful log entries (and some don't)

```
const/4 v10, 0x0
monitor-enter v4
:try_start_0
iget-object v0, v4, LX/8B3;->d:Ljavax/crypto/Mac;
if-nez v0, :cond_10
sget-object v1, LX/8B3;->a:Ljava/lang/Class;
const-string v0, "Could not verify Salamander signature - no SHA256HMAC"
invoke-static {v1, v0}, LX/00T;->b(Ljava/lang/Class;Ljava/lang/String;)V
:try_end_0
.catchall {:try_start_0 .. :try_end_0} :catchall_0
```

LOG ENTRIES

- Signature verification failure is a good log entry to look for
- Remember, you can add your own log entries

MORE ABOUT MESSAGE ENCRYPTION

- Apps usually have more than one location where they encrypt messages
 - Messages
 - Attachments
 - Typing/presence indicator
 - Notification content
- Usually need to add multiple stubs

MESSAGES!

```

[] [] $[]
[]
[] []34
data len:24
press C to continue
Connected by ('104.132.0.101', 38322)
data: 00_&[]@00D0k[]\FYb000[] 0?:00[]00[]0000_09{3jQ0z0!0z7q0000A_== 0-0
data len:77
press C to continue
Connected by ('104.132.0.101', 62469)
data:[]
[]
vxid_ihryu4ce188o22[] Hello?[] 0000(0000[]
data len:48
press C to continue
Connected by ('104.132.0.101', 35872)
data:
[] ?0000[] 0000000000[] 00000[] 00000000[] []'
[] []
[]
data len:249
press C to continue
Connected by ('104.132.0.101', 49945)
data: 1515546751085
data len:13
press C to continue

Connected by ('104.132.0.101', 34493)
data:
[] [] ?0000[] 0000000000[] 00000[] 00000000[] []'
[] []
data len:251
press C to continue Connected by ('104.132.0.101', 62715)
data: 00_&[]@00D0k[]\FYb000[] 0000000000
[] 00000
0000 P00D0000[]0000U?s0[]?H[]000F000=000>@00*) :0
data len:223
press C to continue Connected by ('104.132.0.101', 49801)
data:
?00000000[] 00000000:00[] 00[]{(00[]8000000000[]e000[]01[] :00[] 00[](00[]8000000000[]e000[]0000
data len:565
press C to continue
```

BUG

- One remote code execution vulnerability in Telegram

QUESTIONS



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